As special types of factorization of finite groups, logarithmic signatures and covers have been used as the main components of cryptographic keys for secret key cryptosystems such as PGM and public key cryptosystems like MST 1 , MST 2 , MST 3 and eMST 3 . In particular, as a natural analogue of integer factorization problem (IFP), group factorization problem (GFP) and its hardness assumption over certain factorization basis, referred as logarithmic signature, play a core role in the security arguments for the family of MST cryptosystems. Security is not the unique goal of designing a cryptosystem. Instead, efficiency is also a major issue. In this paper, we design a new secure encryption scheme based on group factorization problem (GFP). Furthermore, we present the security analysis and demonstrate the performance of our scheme. Comparing with eMST 3 , our scheme is simplified with more efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the security of many public key cryptosystems is based on the hardness assumptions of certain problems over finite abelian algebraic structures such as cyclic groups and finite fields. Two well-known hard problems are the integer factorization problem (IFP) and discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [14] , [18] , [20] , [39] . However, Shor's and other quantum algorithms [22] , [37] , [41] , [42] can solve the IFP and DLP in polynomial time. For instance, Grover's algorithm [22] can improve brute-force attacks by significantly reducing search spaces for private keys. In other words, these hardness assumptions would be broken if quantum computers become practical [31] , [34] , [35] . Note that the theoretical foundations for many current public cryptographic primitives lie in the intractability of mathematical problems closer to number theory than group theory. Number theory deals mostly with abelian groups. It is well known that non-commutative algebraic structures can increase the hardness of some mathematical problems significantly [7] , [9] , [36] . Therefore, it is meaningful to design secure The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Tony Thomas. and efficient cryptosystems based on non-abelian algebraic structures.
It is always remained an attractive aspect for researchers to study the underlying intractable assumptions of mathematical problems for cryptographic primitives. Regarding the non-commutative cryptography, the related work started from 1980's, when the difficult problems in group theory were incorporated into cryptographic domain. In 1984, Wagner and Magyarik [50] devised a public key cryptosystem on the basis of undecidable word problem in groups and semigroups. After that, Birget et al. [8] pointed out that Wagner's method is not based on the word problem but on a simpler assumption. Furthermore, they designed a new public key cryptosystem based on the word problem in finite generated groups. In 1999, Anshel et al. [1] put forward a key exchange protocol based on the intractability of the solving equation problem in non-abelian groups. At the same time, they claimed that the braid group can be used as a platform in public key cryptosystems. Subsequently, Dehornoy [15] , [26] systematically developed the braid group cryptography on the basis of conjugacy search problem (CSP). In 2002, Grigoriev and Ponomarenko [21] proposed the first homomorphic encryption scheme based on non-abelian groups. The corresponding intractable assumption is the membership problem (MP) in the integer matrix group. Hereafter, Eick [17] , Shpilrain and Ushakov [46] and Baumslag et al. [6] et al. raised several public key cryptosystems on the basis of polycyclic groups and linear groups. In 2006, Cao et al. [12] recommended an innovative perspective for designing public key cryptosystems based on non-commutative rings. Since 2009, Habeeb et al. [23] , [27] - [29] brought forward a series of key exchange protocols and public key encryption schemes based on group ring matrices, corresponding intractable assumptions are reported to be DLP and factorization problem (FP) in group ring matrices, respectively. Afterwards, Eftekhari [16] , [33] , [36] , [40] gave an efficient quantum algorithm in polynomial complexity on the DLP in group ring matrices. Recently, algebraic eraser (AE) has also become a typical representative of non-commutative cryptography because of its potential to resist against known quantum attacks [2]- [5] .
At the same time, group factorization problem (GFP) has gradually become a typical intractable assumption in group theory [13] , [30] , [32] , [43] , [48] . A type of cryptosystems based on GFP has achieved rapid development in recent thirty years. From 1986 to 2010, Lempken et al. [30] , [32] , [43] , [48] have made great achievements on devising cryptosystems based on logarithmic signatures and covers in non-abelian groups. Especially in 2009, Lempken et al. [30] put forward a practical platform-Suzuki 2-group [25] and put MST cryptosystems into practice. In 2013, Svaba et al. [44] analyzed the LS in finite abelian groups in detail, and devised an efficient factorization algorithm with respect to (fused) transversal logarithmic signatures. In 2017, Hong et al. [24] made some progress towards searching the minimal length key for MST cryptosystems and presented a theoretical proof for MLS conjecture. In the same year, Reichl [38] specifically discussed GFP in finite abelian groups, and proposed an efficient algorithm for factorizing logarithmic signatures. In 2018, van Trung [47] put forward a general method of constructing strong aperiodic logarithmic signatures for abelian p-groups, and promoted the practical application of MST cryptosystems. So far, MST cryptosystems are not known to be susceptible to quantum algorithm attacks, which makes them viable to be candidates for post-quantum public-key cryptography.
A. OUR MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Our main motivation is to design a new secure encryption scheme based on random covers and logarithmic signatures. Comparing with known schemes, our scheme has higher efficiency.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review the related results in MST cryptosystems; In Section 3, we specifically presents our proposal along with its security analysis; The performance and illustrations are introduced in Section 4.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. COVER, LOGARITHMIC SIGNATURE AND GROUP FACTORIZATION PROBLEM
Definition 1 (Cover and Logarithmic Signature [30] , [48] ): Let G be a finite group, A ⊆ G. Let α = [A 1 , · · · , A k ] be the ordered sequence of subsets A i in G such that A i = [a i1 , · · · , a ir i ] with a ij ∈ G (1 ≤ j ≤ r i ). Then, α is called a cover for G (or A) if each g ∈ G (or A) can be represented as a product g = a 1j 1 · · · a kj k (1) with a ij i ∈ A i (1 ≤ i ≤ k). If each g ∈ G(or A) can be expressed in an unique way, then α is said to be a logarithmic signature for G (or A).
The sequences A i are called the blocks, the vector (r 1 , · · · , r k ) with r i = |A i | is the type of α, the length of α is defined to be l(α) = k i=1 r i . If the factorization aforementioned (1) can be achieved in polynomial with log 2 |G| , then α is called tame (factorizable). [30] , [48] 
Definition 2 (Cover (Logarithmic Signature) Mappings
Consider the maps λ α and θ α defined by
Note that λ α is a bijection, and both λ α and λ −1 α are efficiently computable. Define the surjective (bijection) map
Cryptographic Hypothesis 1 (Group Factorization Problem [43] , [49] 
r i is a one-way function. Remark 1: As described as Cryptographic Hypothesis 1, the complexity of solving the GFP depends on m. According to [43] , when G is a cyclic group, the GFP with respect to α amounts to solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in G. In view of the fact that non-commutative algebraic structures can increase the hardness of some mathematical problems significantly, the complexity of GFP in non-abelian groups such as the Suzuki 2-group is much more intractable. In fact, let |G| = k j=1 p b j j be the prime power decomposition
In other words, it is in general an intractable problem to find a factorization g = a 1j 1 · a 2j 2 · · · a kj k for the given group G and an element g ∈ G.
B. MST 3 CRYPTOSYSTEMS AND THE SUZUKI 2-GROUP In 2002, Lempken et al. [30] devised an encryption scheme named MST 3 by using logarithmic signatures and random covers. In this scheme, the secret key are a tame logarithmic signature and several random numbers, the public key are a random cover and its sandwich transform. Subsequently, Blackburn et al. [10] specifically analysed MST 3 cryptosystem and put forward effective attacks based on this scheme. Furthermore, in order to overcome known attacks, Svaba and Van Trung [43] proposed an enhanced version named eMST 3 cryptosystem. In order to improve the security of this scheme, the authors took advantage of a secret homomorphism to protect the secret logarithmic signature. Meanwhile, they utilized random numbers to realize probabilistic encryption.
So far, the only platform of MST cryptosystems is the Suzuki 2-group of order q 2 with q = 2 κ (κ ≥ 3) [30] , [43] . Also, the Suzuki 2-group of order q 2 can be denoted by A(κ, θ), where θ is an automorphism of F q with an odd order. Moreover, the group A(κ, θ) can be represented by a
is a 3 × 3 matrix over F q . Therefore, G is of order q 2 and the center Z(G) = {S(0, b)|b ∈ F q }. In order to store the group elements conveniently, S(a, b) can be denoted by (a, b, a θ ), then the product of two elements in group G is
In addition, the inverse of an element in group G can be expressed as
and it also requires one multiplication and one addition in F q . If g = S(a, b) ∈ G, a, b ∈ F q , then a and b can be denoted by g .x and g .y , respectively. Thus, we have that g = S(g .x , g .y ). For clarity, we would like to introduce the notations used in this paper (See Table 1 ).
III. MAIN RESULTS
Compared with eMST 3 , a few changes have taken place in public key γ , the ciphertext pairs of our proposal are independent of each other, and the encryption process is also simplified. A. FULL SCHEME 1) KeyGen(κ): Let κ be the system security parameter, G = A(κ, θ) be the Suzuki 2-group with order q 2 , and the message space
. Then it outputs the public key [α, γ ] and the corresponding private key [β, (t 0 , · · · , t k ), f ].
• Choose a tame logarithmic signature β =
public key pk = [α, γ ] and private key sk = [β, (t 0 , · · · , t k ), f ]. 2) Enc(pk, m): For a message m ∈ Z, the ciphertext is a pair (y 1 , y 2 ) which is produced as follows:
• Select a random number R ∈ Z |Z| ; • Compute
• Output (y 1 , y 2 ). 3) Dec(sk, C): For the ciphertext pair (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ G × G, the user utilizes private key [β, (t 0 , · · · , t k ), f ] to calculate a plaintext m ∈ Z as follows: 
then usingβ −1 , we can recover the random number R bỹ
Consequently, using y 1 we can recover message m by
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS Now, we proceed to prove the security of the aforementioned construction. By using the classic techniques in [11] , [19] , our proposal can be easily proved to be IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model. Then, we briefly introduce the proof of our idea.
Theorem 2:
The aforementioned proposal is indistinguishable against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) in standard model assuming that the GFP is intractable in G.
Proof 2:
If there exists an adversary A, who can break the CCA security of the proposal, then the challenger B can solve the GFP in G. The general ideas are presented as follows.
Setup B sets the public values α and γ , then sends them to A. Clearly, A has no ideas about the corresponding private key [β, (t 0 , · · · , t k ), f ]. Phase 1 B builds the following decryption oracle.
• Decryption Oracle O dec : A sends a ciphertext C = (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ G × G to this oracle, B firstly computes R =β −1 (y 2 t −1 k f (y 1 ) −1 t 0 ) and searches whether R exists in Table T [11] , since q dec is polynomially bounded, so B breaks the GFP with non-negligible probability 1/q dec . Specifically, suppose that A's advantage in guessing b = b is which is non-negligible, then B's advantage in breaking the GFP is about /q dec which is also non-negligible. According to the classic conclusion in [11] , [19] , we have that: if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in breaking our scheme, the proposal is indistinguishable against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2).
Remark 2:
Apparently, one-wayness of our scheme depends on Cryptographic Hypothesis 1. Thence, we obtain corresponding security level in analogy with the method in [11] , [19] . Here, we omit the proof of Theorem 2 and attempt to pave an unique path to verify the security of our scheme by using a heuristic method of analyzing the complexity of known attacks.
1) ATTACK ON SECRET KEY
a. In order to obtain the private key β and (t 0 , t k , f ), the adversary attempt to extract useful information from the equatioñ
Specifically, the adversary takes advantage of enough valuesβ(R i ) to construct β by using the corresponding conclusion in [48] . If β is of type (r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r k ), then one can construct a logarithmic signature equivalent to β by using n selected valuesβ(R i ), where n = 1 − k + k k=1 r k . Let {R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R n } be a series of random numbers chosen by the adversary. Theñ
k t 0 , i = 1, 2, · · · , n (13) where y i1 =α(R i ) · m and y i2 =γ (R i ). Notice that y i2 is known, f (y i1 ) andβ(R i ) ∈ Z, it follows that
Since t k ∈ G \ Z, there are q 2 − q possibilities for t k . If t k is chosen, there are q possibilities for t 0 owning to t 0 ∈ t k y −1 i2 Z. Hence, there are q(q 2 − q) suitable pairs (t 0 , t k ). Besides, for each solution pair (t 0 , t k ), there are q equivalent solutions (t 0 z, t k z) with z ∈ Z. Furthermore, since f (y i1 ) is unknown, there are q possible choices for f (y i1 ) on the left side of equation (13) . Consequently, there are q(q 2 − q) different solutions, it follows that the complexity of this attack is O(q(q 2 − q)). b. In this attack, the adversary intents to take advantage of equivalent private key [β * , (t * 0 , · · · , t * k ), f ] to replace the original private key [β, (t 0 , · · · , t k ), f ]. From [43] , the adversary may let t *
so for the first block of γ , it follows that:
Let b * i1 = id, then c i1 = b i1 , we have
We can get that
Since β * is tame, the adversary can take advantage of forged private key [β * , (t * 0 , · · · , t * k ), f ] to recover the random number R. Then, there are q = |G|/|Z| possible choices for t 0 in t 0 Z and q possible choices for f (α(R)), so the complexity for this attack is O(q 2 ) and it's computationally infeasible.
2) ATTACK ON CIPHERTEXT a: ONE-WAYNESS OF CIPHERTEXTS
As we all known that one-wayness is the basic requirement for public-key cryptography. Therefore, we should consider one-wayness of ciphertexts in our proposal. In the encryption phase, we can get that m =α(R) −1 · y 1 from y 1 =α(R) · m. Thence, if the adversary wants to obtain the original message m, he(she) either guesses the random number R, or recovers the random number R from the cover mapping y 2 =γ (R). However, since q is large enough andγ is a one-way function from Cryptographic Hypothesis 1, so it is computationally infeasible for the adversary to recover R fromγ .
b: INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF CIPHERTEXTS
The adversary A sends the challenger B two messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ Z with the same matrix form. B computes the challenge ciphertext C * = (y * 1 , y * 2 ) as follows: • Choose a random R * from Z |Z| , and compute y * 2 = γ (R * ).
• Compute y * 1 =α(R * ) · m δ , where δ is a random number from {0, 1}. If A can not output the correct b, then challenge ciphertext C * is statistical indistinguishable.
In this case, we can analyse the following two cases:
and
Since R * and R admit the same probability distribution, it follows that R * and R are statistical indistinguishable for the adversary. It can be denoted by R * ≈ s R . Meanwhile, sinceα andβ are both one-way maps, so we can get that
Consequently, we can get that (y * 1 , y * 2 ) ≈ s (y 1 , y 2 ).
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section, we focus on analyzing the efficiency and related security parameters of our proposed scheme. Here, we investigate the number of basic operations for one encryption/decryption. The basic operation is composed of addition (Add), multiplication (Mult), exponentiation with θ (Exp(θ)), generation of m-bit random R (PRG), and factorization of β (R) ∈ Z for β using the Algorithms 9-11 (Factor) in [43] . Then, the time of an Add operation is denoted as T Add , the time of a Mult operation is denoted as T Mult , the time of an Exp(θ ) is denoted as T Exp , the time of a PRG is denoted as T PRG and the time of a Factor is denoted as T Factor . Table 2 demonstrates the number of basic operations required for eMST 3 scheme and our proposed scheme. Table 3 reveals the number of basic operations required in the key generation phase (including public keys and private keys). In addition, we utilize the NTL library [45] , measure on a machine with macOS, 1.8 GHz Intel Core i5 processor, 4G RAM and 1600 MHz DDR3, and implement our scheme in C++. We obtain average time of every operation in one encryption/decryption using the method of repeated computing one thousand times, and the experimental results reveal that T Add = 0.019ms, T Mult = 0.26ms, T Exp = 3.556ms, T PRG = 1.8ms and T Factor = 2.74ms.
Upon receiving the computational overheads of T Add , T Mult , T Exp , T PRG and T Factor , on the one hand, we vary k from {8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56 , 64, 72, 80} and depict the variation of computational overheads of eMST 3 and our scheme for one encryption/decryption in term of k, which is presented in Figure 1 . As shown in Table 2 and Figure 1 , comparing with eMST 3 scheme, our proposed scheme has a lower computational overhead for one encryption/decryption in terms of Add operation, Mult operation and total.
On the other hand, we vary k from {20, 40, 60, 80, 100}, running time from {5, 10, 15, 20} and depict the computational overheads of our private and public keys for the key generation phase in Figure 2 . As described in Table 3 and Figure 2 , it is obvious that the computational overhead of generate public key α is the highest of all the others, that of generate private key β is the lowest, that of generate private key [t 0 , . . . , t s , f ] is lower than that of generate public key γ . In addition, the generation of public keys needs a higher computational overhead in the key generation phase comparing with that of private keys.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we put forward a new secure encryption schemes on the basis of random cover and logarithmic signature. The intractability assumption of our scheme is group factorization problem (GFP) on a type of Suzuki 2-group. Comparing with eMST 3 scheme, our scheme has higher efficiency. Also, our method is universal and can realize basic encryptions on files and images.
